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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKERS COMPENSATION: EQUAL
PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO THE AGRICULTURAL
EXEMPTION AND USE OF RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY IN
Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau,
518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
Robert C. Haney injured his back cleaning a grain storage bin while
employed by Grindberg Farms. 1  Haney filed a claim with the North
Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau [hereinafter the Bureau] to
receive benefits for his injury. 2 The Bureau found that Haney was
injured while engaged in an agricultural employment activity, which is
exempt from mandatory coverage of the North Dakota Workers Com-
pensation Act. 3 Accordingly, the Bureau concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed Haney's claim.4
Haney appealed the Bureau's final determination to the district
court, challenging the constitutionality of the agricultural exemption
from the Workers Compensation Act.5 Haney argued that the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution. 6
1. Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 196 (N.D. 1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (Supp. 1993). The workers compensation
statute provides coverage for all employees injured in the course of "hazardous employment." §
65-01-02. Hazardous employment is defined as "any employment in which one or more employees
are employed regularly in the same business or in or about the establishment except: [a]gricultural ...
service." § 65-01-02(22)(a). The Bureau also found that Grindberg Farms did not voluntarily bring
itself within the Act's coverage through elective workers compensation coverage. Appellant's Brief
at A-4, Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994) (No.
930324). Employers who are exempt from mandatory coverage for their employees may elect to
provide coverage by complying with the Workers Compensation Act provisions and making premium
payments to the fund, thus making workers compensation the exclusive remedy. N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-04-29 (Supp. 1993).
4. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 196. Haney then sought an administrative appeal which consisted of a
formal hearing. Appellant's Brief at 5. At the formal hearing, the Bureau similarly found that
Haney's injury occurred while performing agricultural-related work and thus affirmed its earlier
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction because such activity is exempt from workers compensation
coverage. Appellant's Brief at A-6. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-14 to -15 (Supp. 1993)
(explaining the process of administrative agency appeals). A party wanting to appeal a final order of
the workers compensation bureau may file a petition for rehearing within 30 days after the final order.
§ 28-32-14(2). It is within the agency's discretion to grant or deny the rehearing. § 28-32-14(3). If a
rehearing is granted, the agency may issue a new final order. § 28-32-14(4). If the agency does not
act upon the petition within 30 days, the petition is deemed denied. Id. Following either the first final
order or the final order upon rehearing, the injured party has 30 days to appeal to the district court. §
28-32-15(1). The party is not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
review. § 28-32-14(1). Appeals to the district court must specify the grounds and parties of the
appeal. § 28-32-15(4).
5. Appellant's Brief at 5.
6. Appellant's Brief at A-35. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21. The North Dakota equal protection clause
provides that "[nlo special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered,
revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." Id.
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The district court, however, rejected Haney's claim and affirmed the
Bureau's lack of jurisdiction and denial of benefits. 7
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Haney again argued
that the agricultural exclusion to the Workers Compensation Act violated
the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution. 8 Haney
urged the court to apply an intermediate scrutiny to the exemption
because it concerned an important substantive right.9 The agricultural
exemption, Haney claimed, could not satisfy an intermediate level
because the exemption does not closely correspond to legislative goals.O
Haney relied upon the court's previous decision in Benson v. North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau.1 l In Benson, a three-Justice
majority used an intermediate level of review to conclude that the
agricultural exemption violated the equal protection clause of the North
Dakota Constitution.1 2 The Benson court stated that there was "no
correspondence" between the expressed purpose of the Workers Com-
pensation Act of providing reliable relief to injured workers1 3 and the
statutory classification of agricultural employees and nonagricultural
employees.14 However, because North Dakota law requires a concur-
rence of four justices to nullify an existing statute when it is held to be
7. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 196.
8. N.D. CONSr. art. I, § 21. See supra note 6.
9. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 200.
10. Id. When dealing with equal protection challenges to legislation, courts typically choose
from three levels of review, rational basis, strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, depending upon the
right allegedly infringed. See Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221-22 (N.D. 1989) (describing
the three levels of review used to examine equal protection challenges). The rational basis standard
requires that the legislation be upheld unless it is patently arbitrary or is not reasonably related to a
legitimate state goal. Id. at 222. The court noted that if the classification is not inherently suspect,
does not implicate a fundamental right, or does not infringe an important substantive right, the rational
basis test is used. id. This level is quite deferential to the legislature and is considered the easiest level
to satisfy. Rational basis is usually used when dealing with economic and social legislation. Kadrmias
v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 402 N.W.2d 897, 902 (N.D. 1987). The second level of review is strict
scrutiny and is used when suspect classes or fundamental rights are involved. Id. Strict scrutiny is
considered the most difficult level of review to satisfy because the legislation is presumed invalid
unless a compelling governmental interest is promoted by the statute and differential classifications
drawn by the statute are necessary to achieve the statute's purpose. Id. The third level of review is
called the "close correspondence" test or intermediate scrutiny. Hanson v. Williams County, 389
N.W.2d 319, 323 (N.D. 1986). This level of review is regarded as more difficult to satisfy than the
rational basis standard because there must be "a close correspondence between the statutory
classification and legislative goals the statute was designed to achieve." Kadrmas, 402 N.W.2d at 902
(citing Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1982)). There is no clear rule for applying
intermediate scrutiny, but it is generally applied in North Dakota when important substantive rights are
involved. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
11. 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D. 1979).
12. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 107 (N.D.
1979).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1993). The Workers Compensation Act states
that "the prosperity of the state depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its wage workers"
thus, definite relief is provided regardless of questions of fault. id.
14. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 107.
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unconstitutional, the Benson majority of three did not eradicate the
agricultural exemption.15 Since the statute was not changed legislatively,
the agricultural exemption to workers compensation remained intact. 16
Disagreeing with Haney's reliance on Benson, the North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected the level of scrutiny used in Benson and over-
ruled that decision. 17 Instead, the Haney court found workers compen-
sation to be social and economic legislation requiring application of the
lower rational basis level of scrutiny. 18 Using this standard, the Haney
court held that the agricultural exemption to the Workers Compensation
Act does not violate the equal protection clause of the North Dakota
Constitution.19
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. WORKERS COMPENSATION GENERALLY AND THE AGRICULTURAL
EXEMPTION DEFINED
The North Dakota State Legislature enacted the Workers Compensa-
tion Act in 1919 to provide predictable relief for injured employees and
to limit liability of employers.2 0 The coverage of the Workers Compen-
sation Act extends to all workers injured in the course of "hazardous
employment."21 Hazardous employment includes any employment
where one or more persons are regularly employed, unless excepted
from the statute.22 If the employer is required by law to pay into work-
ers compensation for his employees, or has done so voluntarily, 23 the
15. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4. The relevant North Dakota constitutional provision requires that
"the supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the
members of the court so decide." Id.
16. See infra note 56 (discussing proposed legislation to eliminate or change the agricultural
exemption in North Dakota).
17. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 199.
18. Id. at 200. Specifically, the supreme court concluded that "the rational basis test is the
appropriate standard of review to apply in assessing the validity of the agricultural exclusion from
mandatory workers compensation coverage in light of the equal protection guarantee of Art. I, § 21,
N.D. Const." Id.
19. Id. at 202.
20. 1919 N.D. Laws 162, at 258. The court has recently stated that "[a]lthough North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Act has been often amended, the stated purpose of the Act has remained
essentially as enacted in 1919." Benson, 283 N.W.2d 96, 97 (N.D. 1979). The statute provides that
"for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for their families and dependents, sure and
certain relief is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other
remedy, proceeding, or compensation." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (Supp. 1993).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (Supp. 1993).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22) (Supp. 1993). The statutory definition of hazardous
employment includes "any employment in which one or more employees are employed regularly in
the same business or in or about the establishment except: [a]gricultural ... service." Id.
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-29 (Supp. 1993). Exempt employers under section 65-01-01 can
limit their liability by voluntarily paying fund premiums and complying with the Workers Compensation
Act making it the exclusive remedy for injured employees. Id. See supra note 3 (discussing elective
1995]
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employer is immune from suit by injured employees or their families. 24
If the employer is exempted from the workers compensation provisions,
the employee must use an alternative method to recover for injuries
sustained on the job.25
Agriculture remains, as it has been from the date of the original
enactment of the Act, specifically excluded from the definition of
hazardous employment and consequently, exempt from the relief
provided by workers compensation provisions. 26
As in North Dakota, many states cover agricultural labor differently
from other types of employment in their workers compensation stat-
utes.27 Those states throughout the nation which treat agricultural labor
differently can be grouped into two main categories.2 8 The first catego-
ry includes those states, like North Dakota, which broadly exclude all
agricultural labor from its workers compensation provisions.2 9 These
workers compensation coverage).
24. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01, -08; 65-04-29 (1985 & Supp. 1993). See Barsness v. General
Diesel & Equip., 422 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1988) (explaining that when an employer complies with
workers compensation requirements, those benefits are the employee's exclusive remedy).
25. Note, Workmen's Compensation Laws and Equal Protection: Does Gallegos Portend the
Demise of the Agricultural Exclusion?. 1973 DUKE LJ. 705, 706-07 (1973) (hereinafter Gallegos).
Alternative remedies for agricultural employees not covered under workers compensation include
expensive tort actions or social security disability benefits. Id.
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (Supp. 1993). Other occupations that continue to be
exempted from workers compensation coverage from the time of original enactment are domestic
service and employees of railroad carriers. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-02(22)(b), (22)(c). See 1919
N.D. Laws 162, at 258 (creating the workers compensation act in North Dakota). Domestic services
are often regarded as being performed by independent contractors, thus making workers
compensation coverage inapplicable. Morin v. Department of Social Services, 436 N.W.2d 729, 732
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989). Injured railroad employees receive compensation under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1986). See Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S.
152, 158 (1918) (noting that injured railroad employees are compensated under federal statute, thus
determining their exclusion from the state workers compensation statute did not violate equal
protection guarantees).
27. 3 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW, § 20.03[3] (1993).
28. Id.
29. There are nine states which use the broad exception to exclude all agricultural labor. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(12)(iii) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993) (providing that "'[e]mployment'
means: [elvery employment .. .except [algricultural farm labor"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-505(l)
(1993) (providing an exception for "agricultural pursuits and employments incident thereto"); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.630(1) (Michie 1993) (providing that "[tihe following shall constitute
employers mandatorily subject to .. .the provisions of this chapter: [any person, other than one
engaged solely in agriculture"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1045 (West 1988) (exempting from its
workers compensation provisions "employees of any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
principal business of agriculture or farming operations"); Mo. A NN. STAT. § 287.090 (Vernon 1993)
(excluding "[e]mployment of farm labor" from mandatory coverage of its workers compensation
statutes); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106(2) (1993) (excluding from its definition of covered hazardous
occupations "employers of farm or ranch laborers"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (Supp.
1993) (exempting agricultural service from mandatory workers compensation coverage); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-29-5 (1986) (providing that "this title shall not apply to employers of employees engaged in
... agriculture"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-106(3) (1991) (providing that the workers compensation
does not apply to "farm or agricultural laborers and employers thereof').
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states specifically exempt agricultural employers or exclude agricultural
labor from the statutory definition of employment. 30 The second
category includes those states which have a narrower, more detailed
agricultural exclusion. 3 1 These states exempt agricultural labor from
their workers compensation statutes by a variety of methods, such as
excluding agricultural employers with fewer than five employees, 32 or
excluding those employers who have paid under $100,000 in employee
30. See supra note 29.
31. There are twenty-one states which have a narrower, more detailed exception for agricultural
labor. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 2301(9) (1985) (excluding from its workers compensation
statutes the "wife and minor children of a farm employer"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(15)(c)(2) (West
1991) (excluding "agricultural labor performed on a farm . . . [by one] who employs 5 or fewer
regular employees and who employs fewer than 12 other employees at one time"); IDAHO CODE §
72-212(8) (1989 & Supp. 1994) (excluding those listed agricultural pursuits from its workers
compensation scheme such as "the raising or harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity
including the raising ... and management of livestock, bees, poultry" and several others); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 85.1(3)(a) (West 1984) (providing exceptions for children and spouses of agricultural
employers, but those employers "whose total cash payroll to one or more persons other than those
exempted ... amounted to two thousand five hundred dollars or more during the preceding year" are
not exempt); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 2(1-A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (excluding agricultural
employers "when harvesting 150 cords of wood or less each year from farm wood lots"); MD. CODE
ANN. 9-210210 (1991) (providing coverage for farm employees if the "farmer has at least [three]
full-time employees"); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.115(d)-(e) (West 1985) (providing coverage for
"[aill agricultural employers of [three] or more employees paid hourly wages ... who are employed
35 or more hours per week"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.041(l)(b) (West 1993) (providing an exception
for those employed on a family farm which is defined as one which pays less than eight thousand
dollars annually); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-5 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (providing an exception for
agricultural labor "but this exemption does not apply to the processing of agricultural products when
carried on commercially"); N.Y. WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 3 (McKinney 1992) (providing the
same workers compensation coverage for farm workers "employed during any part of the twelve
consecutive months . . . in which cash remuneration paid to all farm laborers aggregated twelve
hundred dollars or more"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1991) (exempting agricultural laborer "when
fewer than 10 full-time nonseasonal farm laborers are regularly employed"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4121.01(A) (Anderson 1991) (exempting "agricultural pursuits which do not involve the use of
mechanical power" from its workers compensation scheme); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 2.1, 2.2
(West 1992) (excluding farm employees "not engaged in operation of motorized machines" and those
whose employer "had a gross annual payroll in the preceding calendar year of less than One Hundred
Thousand Dollars cash wages"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 62-3-15 to -17 (1993) (providing
workers compensation coverage for "the business of operating threshing machines, grain combines,
corn shellers, cornhuskers, shredders" and others specifically listed, otherwise agricultural labor is
exempt); TEx. LABOR CODE ANN. § 406.161(l)-(6) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing coverage for
farm labor if "employed by a person with a gross annual payroll for the preceding year in an amount
not less than ... $25,000"); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-42(4) to (5) (1994) (providing an exception for
agricultural employers if "his employees are all members of his immediate family" or "he employed
five or fewer persons"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601(14)(C) (1987) (providing an exception from
workers compensation for employers "whose aggregate payroll is less than $2,000 in a calendar
year"); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101(B)(7) (Michie 1991) (providing coverage for agricultural workers
if the "employer regularly has in service more than two full-time employees"); W.VA. CODE §
23-2-1(b)(2) (1985) (providing an exemption for "employers of five or fewer full-time employees in
agricultural service"): Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.04 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing coverage for
those "engaged in farming who on any 20 consecutive days during a calendar year employs 6 or more
employees (sic)"); Wvo. STAT. § 27-14-108 (Supp. 1994) (providing an exemption for agricultural
labor that is within its statutory groupings).
32. W.VA. CODE § 23-2-1(b)(2) (1985). See supra note 31 for additional examples of exclusions.
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wages in the past year. 33 The narrower detailed exclusion functions to
exclude primarily small family-operated farms from workers compensa-
tion provisions, while requiring the remainder of agricultural employers
to comply with the workers compensation statute.
Both categories of excluding employees engaged in agricultural
activity lead to definitional problems.34 Courts must determine whether
the activity which gave rise to the injury was "agricultural activity" as
defined by the statute. 35 This can be especially difficult when the
activity falls between agriculture and commercial enterprise, as in large
agribusiness. 36 Determining the scope of the exemption can also be
troublesome when the employee's duties are both agricultural and
nonagricultural in nature. 37
B. THEORIES FOR THE INITIAL AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION AND ITS
PRESERVATION
Several theories for excluding agriculture from workers compensa-
tion laws have been identified. 38 One identified theory is that farm labor
is not hazardous. 39 A second theory is that the exclusion of agriculture
was necessary to overcome political opposition to the passage of the first
workers compensation acts. 40 A third theory is that agricultural em-
ployers would be unable to administer the details associated with workers
compensation laws. 41 The difficulty for the agricultural employer to
pass on the cost of workers compensation coverage to consumers is a
fourth theory for excluding agriculture. 42 However, using these theories
33. OKLA. S TAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 2.1,2.2 (West 1992). See supra note 31 for further examples of
the narrower category of exclusion.
34. HARL, supra note 27, § 20.03[4].
35. E.g., Sellmer v. Ruen, 769 P.2d 577, 578 (Idaho 1989) (determining that worker was involved
in an agricultural pursuit when injured lifting a bag of potatoes at a warehouse).
36. HARL, supra note 27, § 20.03[4]. See Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 608 P.2d 535, 536
(N.M. 1980) (determining that an employee whose primary responsibility was to manufacture
fertilizer for a commercial pecan farmer was an "agricultural worker" and thus covered under the
exemption and not entitled to workers compensation benefits).
37. HARL, supra note 27, § 20.03[4]. See Frost v. Builders Service, Inc., 760 P.2d 43, 47 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the employee, whose duties included construction of farm buildings as well
as tending to cattle, was not engaged in an agricultural pursuit and thus was covered by workers
compensation).
38. HARL, supra note 27, § 20.03[1].
39. Id. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917) (defining excluded
occupations as exceptionally simple and familiar).
40. Clifford Davis, Death of a Hired Man - Agricultural Employees and Workmen's
Compensation in the North Central States, 13 S.D. L. REV. 1, 4 (1968). One commentator explained
that "the exclusion of agricultural employees was a legislative compromise necessary to get the rural
support necessary to enact the first compensation statutes." Id.
41. IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, § 53.20 (1993). See also Davis, supra
note 40, at 4 (noting that necessary bookkeeping at the time initial workers compensation laws took
effect may have caused difficulty for farmers).
42. LARSON, supra note 41, § 53.20. With other occupations, employers are able to adjust for the
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to justify the current agricultural exemption from workers compensation
has received sharp criticism.43 Despite criticism of these theories, the
agricultural exemption remains part of the statutory scheme in several
states.44
C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION
Federal and state constitutional challenges to the validity of the
agricultural exemption have been parallely framed and largely unsuc-
cessful. 45 Agricultural employees claim they are not receiving equal
protection 46 under the workers compensation statutes because of the
differential classification of agricultural laborers from other laborers.
47
Courts have primarily used the permissive rational basis standard of
review to examine the equal protection challenges and have upheld the
cost of workers compensation coverage by raising the price of the product sold. Id.; see also Davis,
supra note 40, at 7 (comparing agricultural pricing of product to manufacturers' ability to raise the
cost of goods). In agriculture, the price is fixed by the market, not the cost of production of the
farmer. Id. at 6. Workers compensation operates as an additional cost leaving the farmer with this
extra cost of production at a competitive disadvantage. Gallegos, supra note 25, at 709.
43. LARSON, supra note 41, § 53.20. The theory that agriculture is not hazardous as a justification
for initial exclusion of agricultural labor from workers compensation has since been rejected by courts
and experts because of technical advancements and inherent dangerousness of agricultural employ-
ment. Id. The political compromise which may have been necessary for the initial enactment of
workers compensation schemes has also been rejected as a justification for sustaining the agricultural
exemption. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 104 (N.D.
1979). As one court has stated, the "political expedience may have justified the exclusion ... [b]ut, in
the light of the passage of time, changed conditions ... that cannot justify the exemption forever." Id.
The theory concerning the inability of agricultural employers to administer the details of workers
compensation provisions has also been rejected as a current justification for their exclusion. LARSON,
supra note 41, § 53.20 (explaining that the difficulty in administration for small farmers cannot be used
to justify the exclusion of employees of large agribusinesses which "have more in common with
industry than with old-fashioned dirt farming"). Additionally, many statutory schemes exempt small
employers and family farms. See supra note 31 (listing state statutory schemes with narrower
exemptions). See also Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 106 (rejecting the size of the operation as a justification
for exemption because many small, family owned businesses suffer the same burden and are not
exempt from workers compensation as are agricultural employers). The inability of the farmer to pass
on the additional cost of workers compensation coverage is rejected by experts as a justification for
exclusion because the competitive disadvantage of cost absorption in the domestic market can be
avoided by requiring that all agricultural employers provide workers compensation. LARSON, supra
note 41, § 53.20. One commentator stated that "the increasing acceptance of voluntary [workers
compensation] coverage by agricultural employers casts doubts on the argument . . . that these
producers cannot bear the costs they have voluntarily assumed." Davis, supra note 40, at 8. The
competitive disadvantage of cost absorption in the world market is expected to be slight because of the
multitude of other factors which affect world agricultural prices. LARSON, supra note 41, § 53.20.
44. See supra notes 29-31 (listing states which exempt agricultural labor from workers
compensation statutes).
45. See infra note 48 (examining federal and state equal protection challenges to the agricultural
exemption from workers compensation schemes).
46. The United States Constitution provides that "[njo state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The parallel North
Dakota constitutional provision provides: "[n]o . . . citizen or class of citizens [shall] be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 21.
47. E.g., Otto v. Hahn, 306 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Neb. 1981).
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legislation under both the federal and state constitutions 48 Using this
lowest level of scrutiny, the court must determine if the legislature had a
rational reason for enacting the statute which is reasonably furthered by
the classification. 4 9 The courts' continuing use of low-level rational
basis scrutiny to analyze equal protection challenges to the agricultural
exemption has rendered such challenges ineffective. 50
D. NORTH DAKOTA'S TREATMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION
AND BENSON V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU
The North Dakota Supreme Court heard its first challenge to the
agricultural exemption from the workers compensation statute in 1919,
in State v. Hagan.51 In Hagan, the court rejected the argument that the
workers compensation statute was unconstitutional under either the state
or federal constitution because it covered certain occupations which were
not hazardous, while exempting other more dangerous occupations,
namely agriculture. 52 Using a rational basis scrutiny, 53 the court stated
that "[tihe fact that the act excludes from its operation . . . agricultural
employees (sic), . . .does not give rise to the constitutional objection of
48. To illustrate, the United States Supreme Court, in New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, used a
rational basis level of review to uphold the agricultural exemption to workers compensation against an
equal protection challenge. 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917). In White, the Court determined that the
legislation, which only provided coverage for hazardous employment, did not create an arbitrary
classification by excluding farm labor from the hazardous employment definition since farm labor
may reasonably be considered "patent, simple, and familiar." Id. More recently, an Indiana court
also upheld the agricultural exemption using rational basis review in Collins v. Day. 604 N.E.2d 647.
652 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). In Collins, the court noted the legislation was presumptively valid and
conceivable goals of the legislature were rationally related to the exclusion of agricultural employees.
Id. The court speculated that the bases for the agricultural exclusion were administrative
inconvenience, the inability of farmers to pass additional costs on to consumers, and opposition to the
original passage of workers' compensation. Id. at 651.
Several recent decisions which have used a rational basis analysis to reject federal and state
equal protection challenges to agricultural exemptions from workers compensation are: Sellmer v.
Ruen, 769 P.2d 577, 579 (Idaho 1989); Eastway v. Eisenga, 362 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Mich. 1984);
Hammond v. Hager, 503 P.2d 52, 57 (Mont. 1972); Otto v. Hahn, 306 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Neb. 1981);
Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 608 P.2d 535,536 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Baskin v. Worker's Comp.,
722 P.2d 151, 157 (Wyo. 1986). See also supra note 10 (explaining the three levels of scrutiny used to
review legislation in equal protection challenges).
49. See Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96. 99 (N.D.
1979) (explaining that legislative classifications are upheld if they bear some reasonable relationship
to a legitimate purpose). Under a rational basis scrutiny, there is also a presumption that the legislation
is constitutional and will only be invalidated if it creates a patently arbitrary classification. Id. at
98-99.
50. Other decisions which have rejected state constitutional equal protection claims against the
agricultural exemption from workers compensation schemes using rational basis scrutiny are: Anaya
v. Industrial Comm'n, 512 P.2d 625,626 (Colo. 1973); Ross v. Ross, 308 N.W.2d 50,53 (Iowa 1981).
51. 175 N.W. 372 (N.D. 1919).
52. State v. Hagan, 175 N.W. 372, 379 (N.D. 1919).
53. While the court did not specify a particular level of constitutional review, its use of terms
such as "arbitrary" and "unreasonable" are consistent with rational basis scrutiny. See supra note 10
(explaining the application of rational basis scrutiny)
[VOL. 71:781
1995] CASE COMMENT
unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination as a matter of law." 54 Subse-
quent North Dakota cases did not raise equal protection issues, but
concerned the scope of the agricultural exemption and coverage under
the workers compensation act.55 In the 1970s, four attempts in the North
Dakota legislature failed to eliminate the agricultural exemption from
workers compensation or change it to a narrower, more detailed exclu-
sion .56
However, after years of immutability, a majority of the North
Dakota Supreme Court expressed a marked change in analysis used by
courts examining equal protection challenges to the agricultural exemp-
tion to workers compensation. 57 In Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau,58 a majority of the court used an intermediate
level of review, not rational basis, to scrutinize a federal and state equal
protection challenge to the agricultural exclusion. 59 The three-Justice
Benson majority determined that excluding agricultural laborers from
workers compensation denied them a benefit given to other workers
similarly situated-sure and certain relief for injuries sustained on the
job.60 Under the intermediate level of review, the differential classifica-
tion of employees under the Workers Compensation Act must closely
correspond with the purpose of the legislation.6 1
54. Hagan, 175 N.W. at 379.
55. E.g., Lowe v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 264 N.W. 837. 839-40 (N.D.
1936) (defining agriculture in general, ordinary language, thus workers injured while engaged in
threshing were covered by the exemption); see also Burkhardt v. State, 53 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D.
1952) (noting that a worker killed while constructing a farm building was not engaged in an
agricultural pursuit, but rather was an independent contractor); Kipp v. Jalbert, 110 N.W.2d 825, 827,
829 (N.D. 1961) (stating that an employee hired to dismantle a barn was not performing an
agricultural service, but was not covered by workers compensation because he was a casual
employee); Morel v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 584, 588 (N.D. 1975) (concluding that a beekeeping
operation and honey manufacturer was not engaged in agriculture, and thus was subject to the
workers compensation law).
56. H.B. 1153, 42d Cong. (N.D. 1971) (proposing to eliminate "agriculture" from the exceptions
to the definition of "hazardous employment"). Three Senate bills also proposed to change the
agricultural exemption from a total exclusion to exceptions for farmers and employees engaged in
exchange labor and immediate family members: otherwise, agricultural employees were to be
covered on the same terms as other hazardous employment. S. 2149, 43d Cong. (N.D. 1973); S. 2034.
44th Cong. (N.D. 1975); S. 2547,45th Cong. (N.D. 1977).
57. 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D. 1979).
58. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D. 1979).
59. Id. at 99. The court also noted that in equal protection challenges the court has the duty to
ensure that legislative classifications have a basis for the differential treatment and that those persons
similarly situated are treated similarly. Id. at 103.
60. Id. at 99. The court relied on Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 454 (N.D. 1978),
where an intermediate level of scrutiny to examine an equal protection challenge to statutory notice
provisions was used. Herman, 277 N.W.2d at 454. The Benson court drew a parallel between the
notice provisions and the agricultural exemption because both functioned as a limitation of remedies.
Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 99. The court stated "[tihe complete exclusion of agricultural employees from
workmen's compensation not only deprives the farm worker of a convenient remedy, it also limits his
remedy to a common-law tort action." Id.
61. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 99. There has been no "bright line test for determining when the
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After noting that the Workers Compensation Act gives a purpose for
the entire statutory scheme, but no particular purpose for the agricultural
exemption itself,6 2 the Benson court examined common theories for
excluding agricultural laborers from workers compensation.63 The
majority also relied upon Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Co. 64 a Michigan
case which found an exemption for agricultural employees from its
workers compensation law to be violative of its equal protection clause
using what it called intermediate scrutiny.65 Finding the Michigan case
persuasive, under intermediate scrutiny the Benson majority found no
correspondence between the stated purpose of the law-which is to
provide definite relief to injured workers-and classifying agricultural
employees differently.66 To emphasize, the court stated that no distinc-
tions exist "between agricultural employees and nonagricultural em-
ployees in relation to the risk of injury from employment." 67 Nor did
the court find a close correspondence between legislative goals under
common purpose theories and the agricultural exemption. 68 Thus, the
three-Justice Benson majority declared the agricultural exemption to
workers compensation violative of North Dakota equal protection
guarantees.69 However, because the North Dakota constitution requires
four justices to concur in a judgment of unconstitutionality to strike
down the statute, the agricultural exemption remained.70
rational basis test or the intermediate standard should apply." Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d
319, 325 (N.D. 1986). See supra note 10 (explaining the three levels of constitutional review).
62. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 103.
63. Id. at 104-05. When the legislature does not give an expressed purpose for a law, courts will
consider purposes consistent with its provisions and those purposes most probable. Id. at 103.
64. 202 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1972), overruled by Eastway v. Eisenga, 362 N.W.2d 684 (Mich.
1984).
65. Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Co., 202 N.W.2d 786, 794 (Mich. 1972) (Kavanagh, J.,
concurring). Interestingly, the court used two different levels of review in the challenge to the
agricultural exemption; rational basis to uphold the workers compensation scheme, and strict scrutiny
to strike down the exemption of agricultural employees. Id. The Benson court referred to this dual
review as intermediate scrutiny. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 102-03.
66. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 107.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 105. The court rejected the theory that farm work is not hazardous, noting that to
describe "modem day farming ... nonhazardous defies reality." Id. The court also rejected the
theory that the political compromise necessary for the initial passage of workers compensation serves
as a justification for current exclusion of farm laborers. Id. at 104. A third theory rejected by the
court was that the "closely knit community of relatives and friends" would care for each other's
injuries. Id. at 105. The court noted that it would be unwise and unlikely for migrant workers to count
on such care. Id. The court also rejected the fourth theory that an increased cost to agricultural
employers could justify exemption of their employees. Id. at 106. See supra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text (scrutinizing possible theories for the agricultural exemption from workers
compensation).
69. Benson, 283 N.W.2d at 107. The court based its decision solely on North Dakota constitu-
tional provisions. Id.




In Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau 71 the
court returned to the rational basis level of review to scrutinize a state-
based equal protection challenge to the agricultural exclusion to workers
compensation. 72 However, the court noted that it is not clearly defined
when to use rational basis or an intermediate level of review in equal
protection challenges to legislation. 73 Therefore, to make its determina-
tion of the appropriate level of review, the court examined the essence of
the challenged statute.74
The Haney court found that workers compensation benefits were
economic in nature. 75 To support this conclusion, the court underscored
aspects of the legislative scheme that were economic, such as collecting a
tax from employers and authorizing distribution of funds to injured
employees. 76 Because most past decisions involving economics used
rational basis scrutiny, the majority's characterization of the agricultural
exemption as economic triggered the use of the lowest level of scruti-
ny. 77 The court's use of rational basis to examine the agricultural
exemption aligned it with jurisdictions nationwide, but marked a dramat-
ic shift from the Benson analysis. 78
The dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization of the
agricultural exemption as economic legislation. 79 Arguing that safety is
not just a matter of economics, the dissent stressed that workers compen-
sation concerns an important substantive right.80 The dissent stated that
denying recovery for agricultural employees' work-related injuries on
the same basis as other employees "clearly affects an important substan-
tive right, triggering application of the close correspondence test," thus
making the intermediate level of review proper.81
71. 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994).
72. Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 200 (N.D. 1994).
73. Id. at 197-98. See also Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d at 323-25 (N.D. 1986)
(discussing the three levels of review used in equal protection challenges to legislation and stating the
court "has not been able to establish a bright line test for determining when the rational basis test or the
intermediate standard should apply").
74. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 199.
75. Id. The Haney majority explained that in North Dakota, the court has applied the rational
basis test to "statutory classifications which involve economic or social matters." Id. at 198.
76. Id. at 199.
77. Id. at 200. Rational basis scrutiny is also generally used to scrutinize equal protection
challenges involving social welfare legislation. Id. at 199.
78. See supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions which have used
rational basis to uphold the agricultural exemption from workers compensation statutes).
79. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 205 (Erickstad, Surrogate J, dissenting).
80. Id. See Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325 (stating that the "right to recover for personal injuries is
an important substantive right" which normally warrants the close correspondence test).
81. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 205 (Erickstad, Surrogate J, dissenting).
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The disagreement between the Haney majority and dissent regard-
ing the proper level of review is evidenced in the two varying interpreta-
tions of Lee v. Job Service North Dakota,82 which was used by both to
support their conclusions regarding the appropriate review standard. 83
In Lee, the court used rational basis scrutiny to review and deny an equal
protection challenge to a statute which disqualifies full-time students
from receiving unemployment benefits. 84 In determining that the
rational basis test, not an intermediate level of review, was appropriate,
the Lee court distinguished unemployment benefits, which were a
"matter of legislative grace," from workers compensation benefits,
which involved surrendering the right to sue in order to have certain
relief from the fund. 85 The Haney majority argued that in Lee, workers
compensation was distinguished because the important substantive right
at issue was the right to sue, not the right to certain relief.86 Thus,
because the agricultural exemption actually preserves the right of the
injured farm employee to sue for injuries, the exclusion did not deny a
substantive right.87
The Haney dissent strongly rejected the majority's interpretation of
Lee.88 The dissent argued that Lee expressly distinguished unemploy-
ment benefits from workers compensation benefits because recovery for
personal injuries warrants the use of an intermediate level of review. 89
Thus, the Haney dissent concluded that Lee dictates use of the close
correspondence test and not the rational basis test.90
After determining the rational basis standard of constitutional
review the proper application, the Haney court found that the agricultur-
al exemption was not an arbitrary classification and was reasonably
designed to achieve the stated purposes of the legislation. 9 1 Because
82. 440 N.W.2d 518 (N.D. 1989).
83. Lee v. Job Service North Dakota, 440 N.W.2d 518 (N.D. 1989). Compare Haney, 518
N.W.2d at 200 (using Lee as an example of rational basis scrutiny by the majority) with Haney, 518
N.W.2d at 205 (Erickstad, Surrogate J., dissenting) (using Lee to explain that unemployment benefits
are distinguishable from workers compensation benefits by the dissent).
84. Lee. 440 N.W.2d at 520.
85. ld. at 519.
86. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 200.
87. Id. Employees that are covered under workers compensation are barred from bringing civil
actions, subject to narrow exceptions, because workers compensation is to be an exclusive remedy.
N.D. CENT CODE § 65-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
88. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 205 (Erickstad, Surrogate J., dissenting).
89. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 519. The Lee court stated that "[tihe success of Lee's argument depends
on whether unemployment benefits are an important substantive right on par with the right to recover
for personal injuries ... and thus subject to the intermediate standard of review." Id.
90. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 205 (Erickstad, Surrogate J.. dissenting).
91. Id. at 201, 202. The court noted that there is no stated purpose in the workers compensation
scheme for the exclusion of agricultural employees, and that it is proper to consider unarticulated
purposes. Id. at 202.
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workers compensation was legislatively created, the court stated that it is
within the legislature's power to place reasonable limits upon its cover-
age by exempting agriculture. 92 The court set forth several possible
purposes, which it deemed reasonable, that could have been offered by
the legislature for excluding agricultural workers. 93 For example, the
court speculated that the legislature may have wanted to avoid any
negative impacts upon the financial situation of the farming industry. 94
The legislature may also have intended to shield the agricultural employ-
er from the administrative hassles associated with compliance of workers
compensation. 95 The court found these possible purposes reasonably
related to the exclusion of agricultural employees and sufficient to
justify the rational basis standard of review. 96 Thus, the court deter-
mined the exemption of agricultural employees was consistent with
constitutional equal protection guarantees.97
The dissent, however, argued that under the close correspondence
test the exemption of agricultural employees violated equal protection
guarantees.98 The dissent specifically disagreed with the argument that
the high cost of workers compensation premiums dictated the exemption
of agricultural employees, 99 asserting instead that a goal of cost savings
did not closely correspond with an exemption applied only to agricultur-
al employers and not to other employers similarly situated.100 To
uphold the exemption, the dissent would have required a showing that
the burdens imposed on agricultural employers by requiring them to
pay workers compensation premiums affect them more harshly than
other employers in a similar position. 10 1 The dissent further argued that
92. Id. at 202. See Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 223 (N.D. 1989) (stating that in
rational basis analysis, the legislation is to be upheld unless it is "patently" arbitrary or has no
reasonable relationship to the governmental purpose).
93. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202. The court noted that there is no stated purpose in the workers
compensation scheme for the exclusion of agricultural employees, and that it is proper to consider
unarticulated purposes. Id.
94. Id. The court noted that in addition to the purpose of the entire workers compensation law,
which is to provide sure and certain relief, there may be an unarticulated purpose for the exclusion of
agricultural employees. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. In a concurrence, Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that the legislature is only required to
be reasonable, not logical, in reference to the hazardousness of agriculture. Id. at 204 (VandeWalle,
C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice further stated that it would be wise to eliminate the agricultural
exemption, but that it was "essentially a legislative matter, not a judicial matter." Id. at 203.
97. Id. at 202.
98. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 209 (Erickstad. Surrogate J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 206.
100. Id. The North Dakota Constitution prohibits the granting of privileges to one particular class
of citizens. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21. The dissent noted that other small business, such as small grocery
stores and garages, were also adversely affected by the high cost of workers compensation but were
not given the privilege of exemption. Haney, 518 N.w.2d at 206 (Erickstad, Surrogate J.. dissenting).
101. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 207 (Erickstad, Surrogate J., dissenting). The dissent relied upon
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fewer states exempt agricultural employees than did fifteen years ago,
indicating a trend towards mandatory coverage for agricultural employ-
ees under workers compensation laws.' 02 The dissent concluded that
none of the possible legislative purposes closely corresponded to the
exemption of farm laborer and thus, the exclusion violated equal protec-
tion guarantees.103
IV. IMPACT
The Haney decision reflects settled law for many agriculture em-
ployers. Agricultural employers remain susceptible to tort actions from
injured workers. 104 Although agricultural employers are free to pur-
chase individual liability insurance policies or to elect workers compen-
sation coverage, 105 the success of voluntary programs has been difficult
Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, where that court advocated the use of a
balancing test to determine a fair distribution of burdens and benefits imposed upon the classes drawn
by legislation. Id. (citing Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96,
106 (N.D. 1979)). The Haney dissent was especially concerned with an agricultural employee being
unable to recover for a substantially similar injury simply because of the type of the employment. Id.
102. Id. at 208. The dissent explained that the number of states which have the agricultural
exemption has fallen from 39 to 17 in the period since Benson was decided in 1979, and that "[bly
1992, forty-five states had some form of compulsory coverage for agricultural workers." Id.
Research indicates that as of 1994, only nine states exempt agricultural workers, which is fewer than
the number exempting farm labor in 1979. See supra note 29 (listing the nine states which exclude
farm labor from its workers compensation statutes).
103. Haney, 518 N.W.2d. at 209 (Erickstad, Surrogate J., dissenting). In a separate dissent,
Justice Meschke argued that the close correspondence test should be used because the agricultural
exemption involved an improper wealth-based classification. Id. at 213 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
Justice Meschke argued that the exclusion leaves a politically powerless group without a remedy for
their injuries and "benefits politically powerful special interests." Id.
104. See Eastway v. Eisenga, 362 N.W.2d 684, 691 (Mich. 1984) (Levin, J., dissenting) (noting
that requiring workers compensation coverage operates to protect agricultural employers from
personal injury actions). See also Gallegos, supra note 25, at 724 (discussing the disappearance of tort
liability for agricultural employees by elimination of the agricultural exemption from workers
compensation).
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-29 (Supp. 1993). The relevant statute provides that any employer
exempt from mandatory coverage under 65-01-02 may elect to obtain workers compensation by
paying the premiums and "is not liable to respond in damages at common law." Id.
794
CASE COMMENT
to assess. 106 However, as farming becomes more industrialized, jobs
connected with the business end of the enterprise have increasingly been
found to lie outside the scope of the exemption.l07 Thus, as the industry
moves further toward commercialization, agribusiness employers may
have difficulty relying on the agricultural exemption to workers com-
pensation relieving them from providing coverage.
08
For agricultural employees, the Haney decision reflects settled
law-that a civil suit may be their only method of recovery for injuries
received while on the job.109 In a tort action where fault is an issue,
comparative fault may make a full recovery for injuries difficult, if not
impossible, for the agricultural employeel10 Recovery will be particu-
larly difficult for migrant agricultural laborers because many lack the
resources to gain access to the court system."I' Additionally, tort judg-
ment collections can also be difficult because of the insolvency or
limited resources of the employers thus leaving employees with no
practical recourse for injuries.
However, the court's continuing use of rational basis scrutiny
involving legislative classifications can have significant implications for
other statutory groups as well. Using the deferential, rational basis
scrutiny usually leads to the court upholding the statute, in what one
commentator calls the judicial underenforcement of constitutional
norms. 12 The practice of not applying heightened scrutiny in equal
protection challenges allows for some constitutionally questionable
106. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 207 n.2 (Erickstad, Surrogate J., dissenting). Justice Erickstad's
dissent discussed the difficulty in analyzing the viability of voluntary workers compensation coverage
by agricultural employers because employers often dropped coverage after a claim was made to
avoid a rate increase. Id. See also LARSON, supra note 41, § 53.20 (noting that insurance coverage
may not always act as immunity from tort suits as elective workers compensation coverage does).
107. See Holguin v. Billy The Kid Produce, Inc., 795 P.2d 92, 95 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990)
(determining that an employee's duties of sorting, sacking, and loading onions were not connected to
cultivation, thus rendering the agricultural exemption to workers compensation inapplicable).
108. N.D. CEr. CODE § 65-04-12 (1985). The statute imposes penalties on employers for failing
to pay workers compensation premiums when the employer is required to do so. Id.
109. Gallegos, supra note 25, at 706.
110. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993). The North Dakota comparative fault statute
provides that contributory fault of the party bringing the action bars recovery for injuries if "the fault
was as great as the combined fault of all other persons who contribute to the injury." Id. Contributory
fault reduces the amount of recovery the injured party is entitled to collect by the percentage the
injured party is found to be at fault. Id.
I l1. See Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 212-13 (Meschke, J., dissenting) (arguing that the agricultural
exemption is a "wealth-based classification that discriminates against a politically powerless and
unorganized underclass of farm laborers"). While there is federal law that covers migrant workers in
safety of health, housing, and motor vehicles, it does not provide specific protection for injuries
received on the job. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1841 (1987).
112. Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 321
(1987). Ross states that using rational basis scrutiny precludes a meaningful equal protection analysis
of the statute. Id. at 319.
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statutes to remain intact.1 13 Using this practice of judicial
underenforcement, the majority upheld the agricultural exemption to
workers compensation in Haney.114 The court's reluctance to use the
intermediate level of scrutiny in the Haney decision demonstrates the
difficulty facing those raising equal protection challenges to legislative
classifications in the future.
LeAnne K. Jabs
113. Id. at 321. Ross argues that by narrowly defining which types of interests are to be
protected by heightened scrutiny, courts use rational basis scrutiny to avoid deciding cases it "feels
institutionally incapable of addressing." Id. at 318.
114. See supra note 97 (quoting Chief Justice VandeWalle, who stated that change in the
agricultural exemption should come from the legislature, not the court).
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